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The Political Biography As A Vehicle For The 
Political Scientist: Dr. H.M. Hirschfeld and the 
Dutch National Interest, 1931-1952. 
John Rhijnsburger 
University of Amsterdam* 
"The dominant that guarantees the integrity 
of the structure" 
-Roman Jakobson. 
Why should a political scientist want to write a political biogra-
phy? Is it because the person in question is so fascinating, or is it 
because the biography might teach us something more about 
politics? I would argue for the latter. Should one come across an 
enchanting person, all the better. But let it not be a prerequisite. 
The biography I want to introduce serves as a means to 
study a fundamental change in Dutch politics after the second 
World War. The man at issue, a civil servant of major importance, 
serves as the entry to the subject. He, or rather his signature, has 
been my guide through the archives. The political-historical 
analysis is interwoven with his life-story. 
Fortunately Dr. Hans Max Hirschfeld (1899-1961) is a 
fascinating and controversial person: fascinating because of the 
various official positions he occupied, and controversial because 
of the turn his career took during the German occupation of The 
Netherlands. Dr. Hirschfeld had the capacity to transform com-
plex political problems into relative simple policy choices. His 
memos make society, and the Dutch economy in particular, more 
transparent. As a top-official he saw political issues primarily as 
practical managerial problems. 
As for the positions he occupied: they may speak for 
themselves. He was head of the Directorate for Trade and Industry 
of the Department of Economics in the years of the Depression; 
head of both the Departments of Economics and Agriculture dur-
*I am indebted to the participants in the ECPR Workshop 
on Political Biography (Boch um, Germany, April 1990) for their 
comments. I am particularly indebted to Meindert Fennema, Piet 
de Rooy and Albert Kersten for their critical reading and to 
William Lasser for his remarks and editorial directions. 
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ing the five years of German occupation; special adviser on 
governmental policies toward Germany and The Netherlands 
East Indies thereafter; the principal protagonist of Dutch policy 
towards the Marshall plan; the main negotiator with Belgium in 
molding the Benelux; a leading voice in the policy of rapid 
industrialization during the late forties and early fifties; the first 
Dutch ambassador (named High Commissioner) to the independ-
ent United States of Indonesia; and chairman of the so-called 
Central Economic Commission (CEC) in the years 1951-2. The 
CEC was and still is the most prominent civil servant advisory 
board of the Dutch government. Before and after his career as a 
public servant, Hirschfeld worked as a banker both in The Neth-
erlands and in The Netherlands East Indies. 
Hirschfeld was controversial because of his role during 
the years of occupation (1940-45). With the government in exile 
he became by his initiatives and strong personality the most 
prominent Dutch civil servant under Nazi rule . Of all department 
heads he was the only one to remain in his post until the very end 
of the war. Others resigned, were fired, or went into hiding. 
During the Nazi occupation Hirschfeld felt forced to make 
a number of decisions that made him very unpopular with the 
resistance movement. The Germans, however, put great trust in 
him. They were well a ware of the fact that Hirschfeld was of great 
importance to them as a mediator between Dutch and German 
interests. They even went so far as to acquit him of his Jewish 
descent. According to Nazi laws Hirschfeld should not have been 
in the state apparatus at all. He himself also put a blind eye to the 
German proclamation by which all officials with a Jewish back-
ground were ordered out of office. 
What was the fate of a collaborator of Hirschfeld' s stature 
after the war? Hirschfeld, who had already started to prepare his 
defense in the last months of occupation, suspended his activities 
at the moment of liberation to account for his war-time policies . 
A few days later the Dutch military authorities, acting on behalf 
of the Dutch government, also ordered him on leave. Hirschfeld 
claimed that everything he had done had been in the Dutch 
interest. But that of course is a controversial issue in itself. For 
what is the Dutch interest? And who defines it? A commission of 
inquiry concluded that Hirschfeld rightfully had raised this claim 
but that he had made some serious mistakes . What he was blamed 
for most was his total neglect of the Dutch resistance . His 
dismissal was recommended. 
The first Dutch postwar cabinet found it very difficult to 
reach a decision on Hirschfeld. Some ministers really wanted to 
get rid of him as soon as possible. Others thought it would be too 
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great a loss, especially in view of the national economic recon-
struction that lay ahead. Most hoped Hirschfeld would resign 
voluntarily . When he did not, they discharged him, but with an 
opportunity to appeal. He did so, and he won. The government 
had to consider the matter all over again. In the meantime-it was 
the summer of 1946--elections had taken place . A new Catholic-
Labor coalition govemmen t had taken its seat and the Department 
of Economics had changed hands. Instead of a social-democrat, 
it now was headed by a Catholic. Hirschfeld now primarily had 
to deal with a staunch supporter of his wartime policies. 
Nevertheless the ministerial discussion threatened to end 
in a stalemate again. A solution could be found only when, in the 
face of a political crisis, the socialist Minister of Agriculture, 
Sicco Mansholt, gave in. The compromise implied that Hirschfeld 
was allowed to resign with all the honors and compliments that 
usually go therewith. But at the same time some severe points of 
criticism were inserted in his certificate of discharge. 
Hirschfeld, being a practical man, accepted the deal. On 
January 1, 1947, he officially resigned. Six days later he was 
appointed "Government Commissioner in General Service," a 
position especially created for him. In his new position he was 
expected to advise the government on policies towards Germany. 
However, at that moment Hirschfeld had already become the main 
architect of Dutch policies towards Germany, because even 
before the cabinet had arranged for his resignation it had already 
appointed him special adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
This dated from October 21, 1946, while the agreement on his 
dismissal was not reached until November. So even before 
Hirschfeld was allowed to leave the Dutch state-apparatus by the 
front door, he had already been quietly pulled in again through a 
specially created side door. Obviously the government was very 
eager to make use of his vast experience once again. 
Spectacular as Hirschfeld's resume may be, it should not 
be enough for a political scientist. The political scientist, instead, 
should ask: will this biography throw new light on politics in 
general and on Dutch politics in particular? The latter seems 
plausible, especially in the post-war years. As a government 
commissioner in general service and particularly as a government 
commissioner for the European Recovery Program, Hirschfeld 
did not belong to any department. He was on the payroll of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, but he actually acted as a deputy 
of the Ministerial Council of Economic Affairs (the Raad voor 
Economische Aangelegenheden, or REA). This subcouncil of the 
council of ministers at that time amounted to nothing less than a 
core cabinet: all leading ministers had a seat in it. And a careful 
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look was given to their party affiliation so as to reflect the overall 
balance in party representation. By virtue of his position Hirschfeld 
stood above and between the departments. He was their coordi-
nating center. For lack of a formal coordinating principle-a 
target of policy everybody could and did agree on-Hirschfeld 
himself became the framework of policy. One might even say that 
for a while he himself was performing the role of the Dutch 
national interest as such. 
We have now come to the question of what the biography 
of Hirschfeld might do for a clarification of politics in general. To 
answer this one cannot evade the question: what is politics? At this 
level of inquiry, I think, politics should be defined as the struggle 
for the definition of the national interest. National, here, means 
Dutch and general alike: Dutch in so far as it means a strategy to 
foster the nation's interest abroad, general as it stands for a 
strategy that pretends to represent the interest of all citizens alike. 
Above that the national interest also serves as the organizing 
principle of the state-apparatus; that institution whose primary 
function it is to uphold the national interest, that is, to defend and 
represent the nation externally and to represent and cement 
society internally. 
The definition of the national interest has two sides: a 
neutral, technical, or administrative one and a partisan, repressive, 
or governing one. As a 'concept of control' it serves to regulate 
and rule society. The definition of the national interest is a 
strategic device to keep society intact together with the state-
apparatus in which this particular task is concentrated. It shares 
the ambiguity which is constitutive for politics in general and 
which is so well expressed in the metaphor of the Janus-face of 
politics. Here the Greek God with the two faces is brought 
forward to show the essentially double-sidedness of politics : both 
integrative and segregative. At one and the same time society is 
seen here as an entity and as a diversity. By conceiving the 
definition of the national interest as a concept of control, due 
attention is given to this most difficult aspect of what politics is 
about. 
What I want the political biography of Hirschfeld to do is 
to shed light on the change of concept of control that took place in 
The Netherlands during the period 1931-52. The questions I want 
to pose are: how does such a change occur? What are the roles of 
the different institutions, nations, groupings and individuals in-
volved? What is the essence of a concept of control? How does 
it function? What or whom does it stand for? Of course it is not 
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my intention to give an answer to all these questions here. I merely 
want to outline the project I am working on. 
I 
But first there is another question I have not yet dared to raise . Is 
it possible at all to write a political biography? Is political 
biography not a contradiction in terms? For people do not live in 
politics by themselves, nor are they born into politics. And, of 
course, they have lives that exist outside of politics. 
Moreover, a biography is not only a life-story in the sense 
that it covers a life, it is also a life-story in the sense that it unfolds 
itself with the life of the individual described. It's a "history with 
a subject" in the narrowest sense of the word. The question is: can 
this subject be maintained writing a political biography? I don't 
think so. While writing a political biography one faces a clear 
choice: either one writes from the point of view of the individual 
involved, or one writes from the perspective of the political 
structures in which he or she is embedded. 
In the first case a true biography might be the result. In the 
second all one can hope for is a political analysis of an individual 
life. In both cases, however, it is the interrelationship between 
politics and the individual that matters. Therefore, both can claim 
to be political biographies. 
In the fust case, however, the individual is either the 
subject or the object of politics. He or she can not be both, because 
there is no life from this perspective. Being both a subject and an 
object of politics does not allow for any action. It leads to a 
contemplative attitude toward politics: that's all. And there is no 
sense in writing a political biography of someone in the role of an 
eternal onlooker. 
However, reducing a person to either the role of a subject 
of politics or an object of politics means one has to give him or her 
all the credit in politics or none at all. There is no in-between. So 
the biographer has to choose between a history in which the 
subject figures as the center of all politics and one in which he or 
she falls victim to politics. Of course one might combine them in 
the sense that they run parallel or alternately. But they cannot be 
integrated. So, in the end, one has a "great man" history in which 
the person involved is presented as the mainspring of politics and 
a plot in which he falls victim to political forces beyond him or her. 
The two together will result in the typical story of the good guys 
and the bad guys in which the good guys are on the side of the hero 
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and participate in his successes, while the bad guys are on the other 
side, causing his failures. "Great man" history and conspiracy 
theory are but two sides of the same coin. 
From the perspective of politics, however, the individual 
can and should be conceived as both the subject and the object of 
politics. At one at the same time the person can be seen as the 
originator and as the victim of politics. The individual involved 
can be granted the initiative and shown to be manipulated at one 
and the same time. This perspective allows a degree ofrelativity 
that a subjective point of view would never permit, and creates the 
possibility of really weighing someone's influence and of really 
establishing his or her meaning for the politics he or she is 
involved in. However, it does not allow for a complete picture of 
his or her personality. Because one is only interested in the person 
in so far as his or her activities are political or are of political sig-
nificance, one may miss vital elements of his or her character. So 
in this case the biographer will not be able to identify the person 
under study. One might be able to ascribe some peculiar personal 
qualities to the individual involved, but no more. No "complete" 
picture can result. So from the perspective of politics one will not 
be able to learn and know a person, but one might trace his or her 
political and historical relevance. 
The political biography as such is bound to miss this point. 
It turns the world upside down by asking what is the meaning of 
politics for one or another person instead of asking what is the 
significance of this person for politics. In the end the biography 
in the aforementioned sense is merely a legitimation of politics as 
such. It makes politics look like a legitimate business. This seems 
to be the main function of the political biography in the traditional 
sense. 
So when one is primarily interested in politics one should 
not simply obey the reigning laws regarding the writing of a 
biography. This has important consequences. For a "political" 
political biography cannot hold the story line. There is no 
unfolding of the subject. Instead there is an adjustment of a given 
subject to changing political circumstances. The change de-
scribed is primarily a change of political structures, not a change 
of the individual involved. Thus the rhythm of change is pre-
scribed by the rhythm in which structural change is perceived. 
And the perception of structural change goes by jumps. From the 
view point of the individual it goes like this: suddenly one finds 
oneself in a situation in which one feels obliged to reconsider 
one's position. The relationship with one's environment is not 
what it was before. New problems have arisen, old solutions don't 
fit anymore. A reconsideration of one's strategy is required. The 
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-evolving debate or struggle will assign the person involved a new 
position within the social or political realm. His or her interests 
are redefined. A new social and political identity is accepted. This 
implies that a subject, a political subject, is taken from crisis to 
crisis; from one strategic reconsideration to another. Time and 
again his or her situation is disturbed by a political intervention 
from one side or another. 
As a consequence of this dual perspective the political 
biography will have a fragmented character. Every time there is 
a change of perspective the story-line will be broken. The political 
biography is built on episodes. The historiography develops as an 
ongoing sequence of strategic reconsiderations. At a higher level 
this multitude of changes within the political realm presents itself 
as a change of politics itself. 
The fragmentary method is a means to describe a ten-
dency; an ongoing, but disrupted, sequence of changes. At the end 
of it lies a definite change in political structure and a new 
definition of the national interest. In our terminology: a new 
concept of control has gained dominance. A consequence of this 
fragmentary presentation of political life is that the political 
biography will have to be a compilation of mini-stories. It will not 
be sliding through history, but will jump from one political event 
and one strategic reconsideration to another. Therefore it cannot 
be purely chronological. Different considerations can go on at the 
same time, each with their own point of departure and following 
their own course of events. Therefore the political biographer will 
have to jump through history like a horse on a chess board, but 
somehow without loosing his or her sense of direction. 
II 
Now let us see how the story jumps in our case . The historiogra-
phy starts around 1860, almost forty years before Hirschfeld's 
birth, because that is where we find the first constant in his 
political career: the striving to bring and to keep different kinds 
and sources of capital together on a private base but with a 
common, a social goal in mind. It was around this time that the 
Credit Mobilier was introduced into The Netherlands. Coming 
from France, this new form of capital acquisition made way for the 
so-called investment bank; a new form of granting credits that 
would link the banks with the other branches of the economy, 
including industry, trade, traffic, merchant shipping and colonial 
enterprise. 
However, it was not until the eve of Hirschfeld's career 
that one could begin to speak of a structural relation between 
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Dutch banking on the one side and the other sectors of the national 
economy on the other. Hirschfeld, who made this development 
the subject of his dissertation, saw the bankers as being in the very 
center of the national economy. In making them responsible for 
the economy as a whole he subscribed to an idea developed by the 
French philosopher Comte Henri de Saint-Simon ( 1789-1823) . 
He thought the bankers should be given the lead in developing the 
productive capacity of the country because they were in the 
position to place capital with the most significant producers. In 
line with this Hirschfeld saw the bankers, that is to say the banking 
community as it gathered around the central bank, as the players 
most suited to formulate a national economic policy. This was 
because the bankers had a vested interest in the economy as such; 
here private and general interest met. Credit was considered the 
instrument to keep the economy going and in balance. By 
directing and rationing it the banking community would be able 
to dampen economic undulations and prevent the development of 
social and political crises. By the end of World War I society was 
desperately in need of such a capacity if it was not to fall.victim 
to the anti-capitalistic forces that were threatening Europe. 
Hirschfeld, being a banker by profession and by zeal, was 
quite surprised when he was asked to come and join the admini-
stration in 1931. By then the economic world crisis already had 
The Netherlands in its grips. It was already clear that the bankers 
alone would not be able to cope with this crisis. Credit, as such, 
was in jeopardy. Of the other branches of the economy, agricul-
ture in particular was hit very hard, but Dutch shipping had also 
felt a severe blow. And as private credit institutions stepped back 
it became all the more clear that the state should intervene to 
rescue the nation's productive capacity . If not, the country would 
face serious social and political upheavals. 
When Hirschfeld joined the struggle the government 
aimed not only at protecting the country's productive capacity but 
also its monetary stability. The first to fall victim to this twin aim 
was the wish to uphold internal monetary stability. By following 
a policy of deflation and trade restrictions the government hoped 
to stop the fall in employment and keep the guilder tied to the gold 
standard. Hirschfeld, who was in charge of the negotiations with 
The Netherlands' two most important trading partners, Germany 
and the United Kingdom, had a hard time balancing the different 
kind of interests involved. 
The government's policy, however, was not sufficient to 
keep employment from falling. Thereupon the binding of the 
Dutch guilder to the gold standard came under attack . Hirschfeld 
and his minister held the attempt to preserve monetary stability re-
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-sponsible for the lack of international competitive power. The 
Prime Minister, however, did not give in. It was only in 1936, 
when The Netherlands was becoming the sole surviving member 
of the gold block, that a devaluation was accepted . Of the Holy 
Monetary Trinity that had reigned in the 1920s one target re-
mained: the balancing of the budget. However, this too was 
gradually undermined. The pursuit of a more active economic and 
social policy, along with the expansion of the state-apparatus that 
went with it, made this target attainable only by some creative 
bookkeeping. The final blow came in 1939, when the Prime 
Minister and his Minister of Finance were not able to withstand 
the joined forces of the Department of Economics and Social 
Affairs and were forced to make way for a policy in which the 
balancing of the budget was only one target among others. This 
implied the end of the hegemony of the liberal-oriented Depart -
ment of Finance and the emancipation of Hirschfeld's own 
Department of Economics in collusion with the Department of 
Social Affairs . The attempt to keep up national production had 
now reached equal status with the goal of monetary stability. 
The road for a new policy was open. But war intervened. 
Instead of a search for a new policy, a period of sheer survival set 
in. By balancing the interests of Germany and the United 
Kingdom the country tried to remain neutral. It was Hirschfeld' s 
task to find a modus vivendi with these two warring nations, now 
mutually exclusive trading partners. This approach ended when 
the German war machine overran The Netherlands in May 1940. 
Priorities changed again. In the first instance the idea was to 
accept the change of circumstances and to go for an Anglo-
German arrangement which would settle German hegemony on 
the European continent. From 1942 onwards, however, it became 
clear the war would be fought until the very end, until the 
destruction of one of the adversaries, most likely Germany . 
Thereafter sheer survival dominated the policy of the civil ser-
vants who had stayed behind in The Hague. Sheer survival for 
Hirschfeld meant not only personal survival, but also the preser-
vation of the economy and the maintenance of the state-apparatus . 
Preserving the economy was equivalent to keeping up 
production . The maintenance of the national income soon proved 
to be an illusion. German policy amounted to forced deliveries 
and created an enormous debt in German Reichsmarks. Keeping 
up production in the eyes of Hirschfeld was equal to keeping up 
society as such. For without production starvation would set in, 
and without the binding of the workers to the producers society 
would disintegrate . Preservation of the state-apparatus not only 
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meant having an instrument with which to defend the Dutch 
national interest, albeit in a rudimentary way, but also to preserve 
an apparatus to take care of the country once the war was over. 
To be able to fill the power vacuum, then, was essential for 
social and political continuity. A prerequisite was that the 
apparatus should not fall into the hands of Dutch national social-
ists. In this Hirschfeld succeeded rather well, although he had to 
engage in a risky confrontation with one of the most prominent 
Dutch Nazis who had become head of the Department of Finance 
and head of the Central Bank as well. Personal survival meant not 
only avoiding acts of war and not provoking the German adver-
saries; it also meant staying out of the hands of the resistance 
movement, which had built up a great deal ofresentment against 
the leading Dutch officials. And towards the end of the war and 
immediately thereafter it also meant being ready for a defense and 
a rendering of responsibility for the policies pursued. In all these 
things Hirschfeld proved to be successful, although with some 
narrow escapes. His aforementioned rehabilitation is there to 
confirm it. 
With Hirschfeld on the sidelines in 1945 the recovery was 
set in motion. In the second part of 1946, however, it became clear 
that the recovery would be halted by a failure to restore economic 
relations with occupied Germany and the rebellious Netherlands 
East Indies. 
From an economic point of view the country was in need 
of a strong and revived Germany. From a political and military 
perspective, however, a weak and divided Germany was pre-
ferred. The solution Hirschfeld presented was twofold: as far as 
the German internal political structure was concerned he pleaded 
for a confederation rather than a federation. Political centraliza-
tion should be inversely related to economic strength. The second 
and most important part of his proposition was European eco-
nomic cooperation. German trade and price policies should be put 
on a European base. No more dumping should be allowed. The 
Dutch government adopted this view. Thereafter Hirschfeld was 
among those who went to London to defend the Dutch position in 
face of the Big Four: the United States, the Soviet Union, Great 
Britain, and France. The four powers, however, showed hardly 
any interest. Inside The Netherlands Hirschfeld's ideas initially 
met strong opposition from representatives of all sectors of the 
economy, except banking. The bankers were the only ones to 
applaud the European approach. But by spring of 1947, as it 
became clear that a simple return to prewar bilateral relations was 
impossible, Hirschfeld' s approach became the truly national one. 
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About this time Hirschfeld was also consulted on Indone-
sian affairs. In April the Indies proved to be heading for a severe 
balance of payments crisis. This was a very serious threat indeed, 
as the motherland herself was also coping with severe difficulties 
in international payments. A loss of the colony would mean a fatal 
blow to her own credit-wonhiness. Hirschfeld was well aware of 
the fact that only an American loan could help. But before 
negotiations could stan economic prospects in the Indies needed 
to be improved. An economic and financial agreement with the 
rebellious Republic seemed mandatory. To see whether this was 
possible a ministerial delegation left for Batavia, with Hirschfeld 
aoing along as an adviser. He soon concluded that there was no 
~hance of an understanding and advised military action. 
The government, however, was facing a serious problem: 
in The Netherlands nobody was prepared for such a twist of 
policy. Financial problems were kept secret and now time was 
needed to prepare public opinion. Also, it remained to be seen 
whether the allies would accept military intervention. Hirschfeld 
left for London and Washington, where he got the impression that 
there was some room for the military approach. It got underway 
by July 22. Militarily and economically the war was a success. A 
large quantity of goods waiting for export were confiscated. The 
Netherlands' financial prospects, however, hardly improved as 
guerrilla warfare developed. Many, Hirschfeld included, now 
wanted to do away with the political strongholds of the Republic 
as well. They were even prepared to challenge the United Nations, 
which had called for a cease-fire. By the end of August, Hirschfeld, 
depressed by the course of events in Europe as well, even went so 
far as to advise the risk of an open confrontation with the United 
States and Great Britain. At least then, he argued, the Dutch 
people would have someone other than their own government to 
blame if the colony had to be abandoned. Political stability was 
always on his mind. The government, however, decided not to 
take the chance, and hostilities were stopped. 
Shonly thereafter a new perspective gained momentum. 
From Paris, Hirschfeld could repon that the first Conference on 
European Economic Cooperation was heading for a successful 
conclusion. That summer, 16 countries had been busy formulat-
ing an answer to the American offer in June to come and rescue 
them from a severe shortage of foreign currency in exchange for 
mutual cooperation and a strong production effon. Hirschfeld 
attended the conference on behalf of the Benelux, the unit of 
cooperation of Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. As 
a member of the five-man executive committee he exened consid-
erable influence, acting as a broker between the ideas developed 
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in Europe and those being worked out in Washington. His main 
adversaries were the French, who were striving for a permanently 
weakened Germany, while The Netherlands was looking for a 
revived and integrated Germany. For the first time since the war 
some consideration was given to Dutch ideas. Hirschfeld also 
collided with the French on the kind of cooperation the Europeans 
should be looking for. The Benelux, although a customs union 
itself, opted for a monetary approach. The French were looking 
for an attack on intra-European trade barriers. The Hague, 
however, feared French dominance resulting from a European 
customs union. Initially, Paris was supported by the United 
States, but as ideas crystallized and the State Department took the 
lead, support for the French withered away. 
Success, however, loomed far away. The amount of help 
Europe was asking for made the Americans stagger. To Hirschfeld 
this came as no surprise; right from the start he had been warning 
that by simply casting up European needs one would come up with 
an unworkable result. Ultimately the conference was in danger of 
a collapse on this British/French approach. Due to a last minute 
intervention of Hirschfeld, who declared the Benelux would not 
go for a result which didn't satisfy the United States, Paris and 
London gave in. In the end the conference could present a 
preliminary report that the American administration felt able to go 
along with. In October Hirschfeld was among those who visited 
Washington to help the American administration prepare for its 
coming confrontation with Congress. 
Meanwhile, European cooperation and American willing-
ness to help-options Hirschfeld had been looking for in his 
dealings with the German and the Indonesian problem-had 
become serious prospects indeed. That is not to say anything had 
been solved yet; far from that. By the end of 1947 The Netherlands 
were still heading for a severe crisis of its balance of payments. 
To prevent bankruptcy, the Minister of Finance wanted 
Hirschfeld to go and ask for interim help from Washington. 
Hirschfeld refused. It would be of no avail: The Netherlands 
economy would not come to a standstill until the summer of 1948 
and the Americans had made it very clear that they were prepared 
to help on a bilateral basis only in case of starvation that very same 
winter. Things were bad, but not as bad as that. The only way out 
was to further European cooperation and to come to terms with the 
Indonesian rebels. This was the course Hirschfeld pleaded for in 
the beginning of 1948. 
Cooperation with Belgium, in which Hirschfeld had taken 
the lead, now came to the forefront. In 1948 it started to open up 
the big power talks on the future of Germany. At the same time 
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it went on to strengthen the Dutch position within the OEEC and 
vis-a-vis the United States as well. In Washington the Benelux 
customs union was held in high esteem as being a first substantial 
step towards European cooperation; the Belgians and the Dutch 
were seen as the vanguard. Cooperation with Belgium was also 
important because Brussels acted as the country's most ardent 
supporter with regard to policies towards Indonesia. Besides that, 
the goal of economic union was a powerful force in the 
government's striving for economic liberalization and monetary 
stability. In exchange for foreign currency support and a leveling 
of trade barriers, the Belgians were asking The Netherlands to do 
away with its war-time policies of rationing and subsidization. In 
doing so they were supporting the Dutch government in its efforts 
to say farewell to the wartime economy. With so many virtues 
coming together, cooperation with the Belgians rose to the utmost 
importance. Hirschfeld, who had taken the lead in urging the 
creation of an economic union by 1950, grew to the height of his 
influence, both nationally and internationally. 
From the summer of 1948 onwards, one could say that 
Hirschfeld did represent the Dutch interest as such. As "Mr. 
Benelux" and the first in line with regard to Dutch policy towards 
the Marshall Plan he became responsible for the coherence of 
government policy. Thanks to his tactical skills The Netherlands 
received a vast amount of American aid and continued to exercise 
a great deal of influence on European cooperation issues. It also 
obtained a position of strength with regards to Western policies 
towards Germany. The latter did not last very long, however, as 
the German problem developed into a superpower contest. Inter-
nally, Hirschfeld exerted a vast influence on the spending of the 
Marshall aid in particular and on the monetary policies that went 
with it. He played a crucial role in coordinating the conflicting 
policies of the Departments of Finance and of Economics. He 
prevented inter-departmental strife from becoming a political 
problem and endangering the existing governmental coalition. 
The only essential pan of Dutch policy that escaped his 
permanent influence was the policy towards the Indonesian 
Republic. Catholic politicians maneuvered the country into a 
second military operation, an adventure which by the end of 1948 
had almost fatal consequences: not only was American aid to The 
Netherlands' East Indies suspended, but Marshall aid to The 
Netherlands became endangered as well. The Netherlands' 
political isolation became so severe that even the Belgians began 
to reconsider their position. Now Hirschfeld started to intervene 
on behalf of Indonesian independence . In his view the colonial 
approach was harming vital Dutch interests, and, in any event, The 
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Netherlands' economic and financial position within the new state 
would be so strong as to guarantee a continuing influence . 
Hirschfeld, backed by American power, proved to have a 
very strong case indeed. From the spring of 1949 on The 
Netherlands government started to work towards a transfer of 
sovereignty. Around this time it also became clear that European 
cooperation was a dead end; as a consequence Benelux coopera-
tion came under pressure again. At first Hirschfeld's attempt to 
create an economic union was saved by the decision to go for a 
"pre-union" by September 1949 and to postpone the economic 
union until the summer of 1950. But as European cooperation 
faltered, in particular because of Britain's refusal to give up its 
special position between Europe and the United States and its 
unwillingness to cut its ties with the Commonwealth, the interests 
of the Belgians and the Dutch diverged even further. Hirschfeld 
was hoping the Americans would intervene and revive European 
cooperation by putting Great Britain in its proper European place. 
Nothing like that happened. 
Meanwhile, Dutch prospects also worsened because of a 
deadlock in the Indonesian negotiations . To save the Dutch 
balance of payments from another collapse, Hirschfeld in the end 
pleaded for an American -inspired "big leap forward" in European 
cooperation and for an internationalization of his own function. 
The latter would imply a transfer of essential Dutch sovereignty 
into the hands of some sort of European agency. Internal coordi-
nation would then become an international affair. 
With the deadlock almost complete and nobody there to 
offer even the glimpse of a solution, prospects suddenly started to 
change. In the beginning of September American policy with 
regard to Germany took a sharp turn, resulting overnight in the 
almost complete liberalization of Dutch trade with Western Ger-
many. This "miracle" was followed by the devaluation of the 
English pound towards the dollar. The Dutch guilder followed 
suit. By the end of October the long-awaited American initiative 
to accelerate European cooperation followed. The special posi-
tion of Britain was accepted and European cooperation was led on 
a two-track lane; a monetary one which would include Britain, and 
one oriented towards dismantling trade barriers, which would be 
confined to the continent. At about the same time the Dutch 
negotiations with Indonesia were concluded successfully, with an 
agreement that independence would be granted by the beginning 
of 1950. 
All of this made it clear that the parameters of Dutch 
foreign policy had been completely changed within a period of 
two months. Now there was room for cooperation with Belgium 
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-once again, while the need for an economic union was lessened as 
new and other prospects for European cooperation had appeared. 
Soon thereafter Hirschfeld, together with the president of The 
Netherlands Bank, figured out that The Netherlands should stop 
considering the English pound, which had been severely weak-
ened, as the leading European currency. This implied a turn 
towards the dollar as the leading European currency and to the 
European continent as the main framework for cooperation, at 
least once Germany was allowed to take its proper European 
place. Without Germany, of course, cooperation would lose its 
attractiveness, since it would imply subordination to the French. 
For the moment prospects still looked grim as the French seemed 
not to be inclined to give in on this point. Yet by the end of the year 
the future looked bright. A surplus in the Dutch balance of 
payments suddenly seemed to be within reach. The promotion of 
exports now became the most rewarding strategy, taking the place 
of economic union with Belgium as The Netherlands' foremost 
policy target. 
In November, Hirschfeld had been asked to go to Djakarta 
to help Indonesian-Dutch relations through the first months of 
independence . He refused. In December the plea was repeated. 
This time Hirschfeld did agree. He did not want the government 
to lose face, and besides he now had an idea of what to go and do 
in Indonesia: develop relations along the lines dictated by Dutch 
export policies. In the short run this meant creating anew platform 
for bilateral relations and helping the Indonesian government to 
establish itself. 
This soon proved to be asking far too much. The Dutch 
legacy, laid down in the federal concept of the United States of 
Indonesia and still omnipresent in the Royal Netherlands East 
Indies Army, proved to be a very unsettling factor. All Hirschfeld 
could do was to save relations from a complete breakdown. In the 
end, after a hectic eight months, he had made hardly any progress 
in fostering economic and financial relations. Dutch credit had 
been granted, and some trade arrangements had been made, but 
nothing systematic had been accomplished. Yet Hirschfeld was 
widely praised for having prevented an all-out disaster. He 
himself was not quite so satisfied, as he had not been able to 
convince the Dutch government of the neea to give way to the 
development of good relations with the Indonesian government, 
for example by showing a readiness to transfer power over The 
Netherlands New Guineas as well. The Hague cherished its 
physical and military presence in the region, whereas Hirschfeld 
thought economic and financial power would do. 
Coming back to The Hague, Hirschfeld found the govern-
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ment in disarray again. As Hirschfeld himself had been able to see 
from Indonesia, the new export policy had failed to provide an 
answer to the many problems facing the government. The final 
blow to the export policy came with the sudden boom in world 
market prices that followed the outbreak of the Korean war. 
Progress in European economic and monetary cooperation, which 
had resulted in a European Payments Union and in an outlay for 
a common market for coal, iron, and steel, had come to a standstill 
again. When Hirschfeld came home he was confronted with a 
chaotic situation which demanded new ways of coordinating 
economic, financial, social, and military policies. 
Amidst the emerging crisis, Hirschfeld collapsed from a 
heart attack. During his illness, responsibilities for the policies 
with regard to American economic and military aid were com-
bined in a new Governmental Commissionership, and the coordi-
nating role Hirschfeld had been performing since 1947 was 
handed over to the chairman of a new council of government 
advisers. Hirschfeld was expected to accept both functions upon 
his return from sick-leave. When this happened, in May 1951, the 
struggle over a new overall policy target was already in full swing. 
Confronting each other were those who wanted to give priority to 
monetary stability and those who wanted to give way to full 
employment. For the moment, however, priority was given to 
political stability. This meant precedence was given to a restora-
tion of the balance of payments, which showed a huge deficit 
again. This compromise did combine a mild inflation with a 
moderate amount of unemployment, but when the latter did not 
improve well enough and the balance of payments took a sharp 
turn for the better the struggle between monetarists and produc-
tionists started all over again . This time the dispute was whether 
to give priority to full employment or to continue to compromise 
and give the lead to exports. The decision was postponed until 
after the June 1952 elections, when the productionist wing, 
represented by the social-democrats and the trade-unionist Catho-
lics took a clear lead over the monetarists, most notably repre-
sented by the right wing of the Catholics and the liberals. 
As a consequence, Hirschfeld quit. He had been working 
on the premise that these countervailing powers could and should 
be balanced. Now that one had the upper hand he was outplayed . 
At the same time, this result proved him to be on the side of the 
monetarists. He had been working on their line of defense. 
Hirschfeld now returned to banking. As a matter of fact, ever since 
1947 he had been a commissioner with the Rotterdam Bank; one 
might say he never had stopped being a banker at all. 
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The year 1952 proved to be a watershed for The Netherlands. 
After this a long period of stability and prosperity set in, leaving 
the years of depression, war, and slow recovery far behind. In 
retrospect Hirschfeld proved to be a functionary of the period of 
transition leading the country from a time in which the soiving for 
monetary stability and global neutrality were central to a time in 
which the securing of full employment and the strategic approach 
towards European and Atlantic cooperation came to the fore-
ground. It was a period in which the definition of the national 
interest changed from a desire for stable growth of national 
income to a desire for stable growth of the national product. 
Before 1931, more weight was given to international trade, 
shipping, and investment than to industry and agriculture. From 
1952 onwards the productive sectors got the upper hand. 
In between, a miraculous juggling of interests took place 
with no one or no combination in a position to hold or take the lead. 
It was Hirschfeld's passionate view that preventing such a choice 
was the best option for political and economic stability. It was his 
job to look for a common denominator, instead of forcing one way 
or the other. He was the crisis-manager avant la lettre. When his 
way of handling affairs ceased to be a guarantee for social and 
political order he returned to private banking. In this he was a 
practical man. He never sought to go beyond the possible, which 
meant that by necessity he went for the existing. In this sense he 
was a conservative. But this does not mean Hirschfeld adored the 
status quo. As reality was a dynamic affair there was no sense in 
preventing change. Hirschfeld, instead, sought merely to control 
that change. 
By now it should be clear that, for the political scientist, 
writing a political biography might be very rewarding provided 
due respect is paid to the selection of the person involved and the 
period described. These strategic considerations should even go 
as far as to determine the point of view from which one writes. All 
three of these issues are of critical importance. In this respect the 
traditional political biography is very limited in scope. While the 
"political" political biography can combine a wide range of topics 
with an ability to explore the essence of politics in depths, the 
traditional biography is bound to be limited to an ordering and 
systematization of a point of view that will be completely out-
dated. Only the former has the potential to deliver a vivid account 
of what politics is all about. 
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